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USING INHERENT JUDICIAL POWER IN A
STATE-LEVEL BUDGET DISPUTE
ANDREW W. YATES†
ABSTRACT
State courts are in financial crisis. Since the mid-1990s, state
legislatures have allowed funding for their judicial systems to stagnate
or dwindle. With diminished resources, state courts have struggled to
provide adequate access to justice and dispute resolution. The solution
to this crisis may lie in the doctrine of inherent judicial power. Courts
have historically used inherent power to request additional funds
from local legislative bodies for discrete expenditures. The use of
inherent power to challenge the overall sufficiency of a judicial
budget, however, has proven troubling. Under the current
formulation of the inherent-power doctrine, a state court contesting
the adequacy of a statewide judicial budget runs into two problems.
First, by invoking its inherent power to compel additional funding, the
court may usurp the appropriation power of the legislature. Second,
state courts threaten their own legitimacy by taking a portion of the
state budget out of the political process.
In response to these problems, this Note proposes a reformulation
of the inherent-power doctrine. Specifically, state courts should
invoke inherent power against a legislature only under a standard of
absolute necessity to perform the duties required by federal and state
constitutional law. This new standard limits the use of inherent power
to situations that threaten the judiciary’s ability to perform its
constitutionally mandated functions. By cabining the permitted uses
of inherent power, the standard respects the separation of powers and
preserves the judiciary’s public legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2011, Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobb resigned from the
Alabama Supreme Court, four-and-a-half years into her six-year
1
term. Among the reasons she offered for leaving office was the
Alabama Legislature’s “alarming reduction in funding” for the state’s
2
court system. She noted that over the past ten years the legislature
forced the court system to spend $66.3 million to meet new statutory
demands while providing less than one third of that amount in
3
additional funds. Cobb’s resignation was not the first time that she
had publicly bemoaned the legislature’s failure to fund the courts
adequately. In April of that year she predicted “delays across the
spectrum” after she drastically reduced the amount of time during
which the state would conduct jury trials, closed all courthouses in the
4
state to the public on Fridays, and fired hundreds of court employees.
After learning in May of a proposed budget that would cut an
additional 8 percent from the judicial system, Cobb held a press
conference asking voters to hold the legislature accountable for the
cuts, contending that the “trial courts [could not] operate” on the
5
reduced funds. She also mentioned that the supreme court was
considering suing the legislature to prevent the new round of budget
6
reductions. “That certainly would not be my preference,” Cobb said
7
of a potential lawsuit, “[but] we’re not ruling that out.”
The financial condition of Alabama’s judicial system is not
unique. Since the mid-1990s, even during times of economic
prosperity, state legislatures around the country have allowed funding
8
for their judicial systems to stagnate or dwindle. The recession that

1. Press Release, Ala. Supreme Court, Statement of Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobb 1 (June
29, 2011), http://www.alacourt.gov/PR/Press%20Release%20ChiefJusticeCobbtoResign.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Bob Lowry, Court Offices Set To Close Fridays, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (Ala.), Apr. 13,
2011, at A3.
5. Dana Beyerle, Alabama Chief Justice Says Lawsuit Possible over Court Funding,
TUSCALOOSA NEWS (May 18, 2011, 3:30 AM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20110518/
news/110519718.
6. Chief Justice Cobb also noted that the Alabama Supreme Court must uninamously
make any decision to sue the legislature for additional funding. Alabama Chief Justice Warns of
Potential Court Fight; Legislature’s Funding Plan Too Little for Courts, AL.COM, (May 17, 2011,
12:40 PM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2011/05/alabama_chief_justice_warns_of.html.
7. Beyerle, supra note 5.
8. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., CRISIS IN THE COURTS:
DEFINING THE PROBLEM, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION, at 2 (2011),
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began in 2007, however, threatened to cause unprecedented damage
to state court systems. As state revenues fell, legislatures looked to
courts for additional savings. From 2008 to 2011, legislatures in most
9
states cut judiciary spending by 10 to 15 percent. The result was a
dramatic reduction in court services. Including Alabama, at least
fourteen states have reduced the hours and days that their courts are
10
open to the public. Litigants and defendants face lengthy delays
before appearing on a court docket. Criminal cases in some states
11
12
may take more than a year to clear, and civil cases fare much worse.
State courts, which handle 95 percent of all litigation in the United
13
States, are struggling to provide the critical adjudicatory services
that make up an effective justice system. As the chief justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put it, state courts are at “the
14
tipping point of dysfunction.”
The gravity of the state-court funding crisis calls for an
appropriately strong solution. The nation relies on courts, especially
state courts, to safeguard rights, support an efficient economy, and
15
provide a buffer from overreach by the political branches. These
political branches, often viewing the judiciary as “merely another
16
government program” rather than a coequal branch of government,
have allowed court funding to wither to levels that threaten the
judiciary’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated duties.
Had Chief Justice Cobb convinced the Alabama Supreme Court
to move forward with a suit against the Alabama Legislature, she
would have pursued a particularly intriguing legal option: invoking
the court’s inherent power. Inherent powers are those not specifically
enumerated in the governing constitution, but which each branch of
government must possess to maintain the ability to execute its
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public_education/pub-edlawday_abaresolution_crisiscourtsdec2011.pdf.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id. at 3–4.
12. Id. at 3.
13. Richard Y. Schauffler & Matthew Kleiman, State Courts and the Budget Crisis:
Rethinking Court Services, in 42 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2010, at 289, 289 (Council of State
Govt’s eds., 2010).
14. Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Benjamin N.
Cardozo Lecture: At the Tipping Point: State Courts and the Balance of Power 6 (Nov. 10,
2009), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/Cardozo_post_final.pdf.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 65–67.
16. Maron v. Silver, 925 N.E.2d 899, 915 (N.Y. 2010).
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17

duties. State courts have claimed certain inherent powers for most of
their existence, generally to accomplish internal housekeeping tasks
18
and to enforce judgments. In the midtwentieth century, courts began
using the doctrine of inherent power to compel additional funding
from legislative bodies. In most cases the funds were relatively
insignificant and for discrete expenditures. In a few instances,
however, courts used their inherent power for a broader purpose—to
19
challenge the overall sufficiency of a judicial budget. Rather than
demand payment for a particular budget item, these courts invoked
their inherent power to demand greater general judicial
appropriations.
This Note evaluates this latter form of inherent power. Because
of the rise of consolidated judicial systems—in which a central
authority allocates funding for the entire state court system—modern
disputes over the sufficiency of court budgets will likely take place at
20
the state level, rather than within cities or counties. These disputes
pit a legislature, which passes a meager judicial budget, against the
state supreme court, which deems the budget insufficient to fulfill its
constitutionally mandated duties. Courts that find themselves in this
situation may wish to take Chief Justice Cobb’s suggestion and sue
their legislature, hoping to invoke the judiciary’s inherent power to
compel additional, adequate funding.
Though this maneuver may sound attractive, scholars have
harshly criticized the doctrine of inherent power when used by a state
21
supreme court to compel funds from a coequal legislature. These
critics have raised two principal objections. First, when a supreme
court orders additional judicial funding, it usurps the appropriation
power vested in the legislature. Second, an inherent-power order of
this type moves a portion of the state budget outside the political
arena. In bypassing the political process, courts threaten their public
support and popular legitimacy. These two problems, scholars have

17. See Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent
Judicial Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217, 223–27 (1993) (“[T]he powers of each branch of
government are not exhaustively listed in state constitutions.”).
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.A. This Note discusses two such instances: Commonwealth ex rel.
Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971), and the New York dispute between Chief Judge
Sol Wachtler and Governor Mario Cuomo.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 117–124.
21. See infra Part II.B.
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concluded, make inherent power inappropriate in a state-level
funding dispute.
This Note seeks to counter this conclusion. Inherent power can
and should be a potential weapon in the fight against diminishing
judicial funding. But to prove useful in the state-court funding crisis,
the inherent-power doctrine needs modification. To that end, this
Note proposes a new standard for courts seeking to compel additional
judicial funding from a legislature: absolute necessity to perform the
duties required by federal and state constitutional law. This
formulation, call it constitutional absolute necessity, improves on past
standards by limiting the potential disputes that would sanction the
use of inherent power and by grounding the use of inherent power in
the judicial branch’s constitutional duties. These two limitations
safeguard courts’ legitimacy and lessen the chance that courts will
usurp the legislature’s appropriation power.
Constitutional absolute necessity builds on articulations of
inherent power provided by two state supreme court cases from the
22
23
1990s, Hosford v. State and Folsom v. Wynn. These two cases
approached inherent judicial power from different angles. Hosford
viewed the invocation of inherent power as a distasteful enterprise,
yet one that courts must entertain—on limited occasions—to
24
maintain their integrity. To cabin the power effectively, the court in
Hosford demanded that courts find additional funding to be
“absolutely necessary” before issuing a funding order against a
25
legislative body. By contrast, Wynn imagined a viable use of
26
inherent power to challenge the overall sufficiency of a state budget.
To the Wynn court, the judicial branch has the obligation to protect
27
itself against debilitating encroachments of legislative defunding.
Wynn does, however, provide a definite limit to inherent power’s use.
Courts employing the doctrine of inherent power must identify a

22. Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789 (Miss. 1988).
23. Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam).
24. Hosford, 525 So. 2d at 797–98.
25. Id. at 798.
26. See Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 900 (“At a constitutional minimum . . . the Judicial Branch of
government must be funded sufficiently to fulfill the duties required of it by the Constitution.”).
27. See id. at 899 (“If the judicial system is to be a truly co-equal and independent branch
answerable only to the sovereign—the people—[then] it must have the power to maintain itself
under exigent circumstances.” (quoting Morgan Cnty. Comm’n v. Powell, 293 So. 2d 830, 847
(Ala. 1974) (Heflin, C.J., dissenting))).
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specific constitutional deficiency produced by meager judicial-system
28
funding.
Neither case alone describes inherent power in a manner that
both limits the potential for judges to abuse the doctrine and retains
the doctrine’s viability in the context of a state-level budget dispute.
Hosford did not imagine inherent judicial power outside of the
county-court setting, and its absolute-necessity standard—without
more—does not remove the doctrine from the realm of a judge’s self29
interest. Wynn continued to rely on a threshold for judicial action
that has proven insufficient to meet the tasks of modern judicial
30
budgeting, namely, the reasonable-necessity standard. Merging the
insights of both cases, however, produces a synergistic result. An
inherent-power doctrine that reserves the power only for absolutely
necessary situations and requires a specific constitutional violation
will provide judicial systems a useful legal avenue for protecting the
critical services that courts provide.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the state-court
funding crisis. Part II recounts the history of inherent power in state
courts—from the early days of courts’ internal housekeeping to the
highly publicized dispute between Governor Mario Cuomo and Chief
Judge Sol Wachtler of New York in 1991—and then describes how
scholars have criticized the use of inherent power in a funding dispute
between a legislature and a state supreme court. Part III responds to
the current shortcomings of the inherent-power doctrine by
proposing, analyzing, and applying a new standard: absolute necessity
to perform the duties required by federal and state constitutional law.
I. THE STATE-COURT FUNDING CRISIS
Inadequate funding has brought many state court systems to a
place of crisis, or as one state chief justice put it, “the edge of an
31
abyss.” This Part will provide some facts about the state-court
28. Id. at 896–99; see also infra text accompanying notes 198–218.
29. See infra Part III.A–B.
30. For a discussion of the history of this standard, see infra Part II.A. For a discussion of
the problems with this standard, see infra Part II.B.
31. Carol Hunstein, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ga., 2010 State of the Judiciary
Address 5 (Mar. 16, 2010); see also Jim Galloway, Georgia Chief Justice: Court Systems on
“Edge of an Abyss,” ATLANTA J.-CONST. BLOG (Mar. 16, 2010, 11:57 AM), http://
blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim-galloway/2010/03/16/georgia-chief-justice-court-systems-onedge-of-an-abyss (describing the Chief Justice’s address as “focus[ing] solely and squarely on
the ever-shrinking 1 percent of the state budget that the court system runs on”).
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budget crisis and briefly address their implications. Since the
beginning of the economic downturn in late 2007, legislatures have
increasingly cut judiciary funding in an effort to shore up state
finances. From 2008 to 2011, courts in most states saw their budgets
32
reduced by 10 to 15 percent. Thirty-two states saw reductions in
33
34
2010, and forty-two faced cuts in 2011. The cuts show no sign of
35
abating. In early 2011, the New York State Assembly eliminated
36
$170 million, about 8.5 percent, of the state judiciary’s funds. The
budget for California’s court system was $350 million smaller for
fiscal year 2012 than it was in fiscal year 2011, representing an 8.6
percent reduction in trial-court funding and a 9.7 percent cut in
37
appellate-court funds. Other states share similar stories, seeing
38
significant percentages of their court budgets cut from year to year.
These cuts occur even though they are unlikely to have a significant
impact on the financial health of a state: court systems consume only
39
1 to 2 percent of state spending.
Court business requires very little capital expenditure: almost all
40
court spending goes to personnel. Consequently, from 2010 to 2011,
fourteen states laid off employees, sixteen furloughed clerical staff
32. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 2.
33. Adam Skaggs & Maria da Silva, Op-Ed., The Cost of Justice: Severe Budget Cuts Are
Threatening Americans’ Access to the Courts, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A13.
34. Wm. T. (Bill) Robinson III, Access to Courts a Fight Worth Fighting, 22 N.C. LAW.,
Feb. 2012, at 7, 7.
35. One might argue that the facts presented in this Part represent a temporary
abandonment of state courts caused by the 2007 recession. Yet trends counsel otherwise.
Legislatures have regularly cut judicial budgets in varying economic conditions since the mid1990s. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 2. Plus, the
factors that led to state-budget shortfalls during the recession still exist. Housing markets in
many areas have yet to recover, a situation that limits statewide revenues. PHIL OLIFF, CHRIS
MAI & VINCENT PALACIOS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE TO
FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT 4 (2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf. Demographic
changes over the next fifteen years will also negatively impact tax receipts. Schauffler &
Kleiman, supra note 13, at 289. Of course, legislatures could raise taxes to increase overall
revenue, which would reduce the severity of their conflicts with judicial branches. But that is a
whole other conversation.
36. William Glaberson, Cuts Could Stall Sluggish Courts at Every Turn, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 2011, at A1.
37. Maura Dolan, Judges Dissent on State Cuts, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2011, at AA1. Court
officials in California predict at least a 15 percent cut in 2013’s budget. Id.
38. Georgia, Maine, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Oregon saw reductions of 10 percent or more
in 2011. Glaberson, supra note 36. North Carolina’s judiciary lost 20 percent of its funding from
2009 to 2012. Martin H. Brinkley, The President’s Perspective, 22 N.C. LAW., Feb. 2012, at 5, 6.
39. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 1.
40. Id. at 4.
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(thus reducing their pay), and nine furloughed judges. Some of these
personnel reductions represent large portions of the courts’
42
workforces. Iowa lost 9.3 percent of its court staff in 2010. The
Alabama judicial system fired over 20 percent of its employees in
43
2010 and 2011. San Francisco County, California, laid off 40 percent
44
of its staff in 2011.
As legislatures slashed judicial budgets, the services demanded of
state courts increased. In 2008, state courts throughout the country
45
received 106 million new cases, the most recorded up to that point,
46
and a 12 percent increase in case volume over ten years. Civil cases
have been the greatest driver of the increase, ballooning by 29
47
percent over that time period. Between 2007 and 2008 alone, the
48
number of civil filings rose 7 percent. Some states have seen
dramatically larger increases than the nation as a whole. For example,
49
Georgia’s court filings grew almost 43 percent from 2000 to 2008.
50
New York’s rose 30 percent between 1999 and 2011. Florida saw its
51
caseload balloon 64 percent from 1996 to 2006. All three of these

41. Id. at 5.
42. IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: THE IMPACT OF BUDGET CUTS
ON JUSTICE 11–12 (2010), available at http://www.iowacourts.gov/wfData/files/StateofJudiciary/
JusticeInTheBalanceJan2010.pdf.
43. See Lowry, supra note 4 (reporting that the court system laid off 120 people in 2010 and
150 in 2011, out of a workforce of about 2500); Eric Velasco, A Month’s Notice for 1/3 of Court
Employees, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 1, 2011, at A1 (noting the elimination of an additional
255 workers on October 1, 2011).
44. Maura Dolan & Victoria Kim, Budget Cuts To Worsen Court Delays, L.A. TIMES, July
20, 2011, at A1.
45. ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 19 (2010),
available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC2008-Online.ashx.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. WASH. ECON. GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE GEORGIA ECONOMY OF
DELAYS IN GEORGIA’S STATE COURTS DUE TO RECENT REDUCTIONS IN FUNDING FOR THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 6 (2011).
50. The Judicial System: The Feeblest Branch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2011, at 31.
51. See WASH. ECON. GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DELAYS IN CIVIL TRIALS IN
FLORIDA’S STATE COURTS DUE TO UNDER-FUNDING 3 (2009), available at
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/1C1C563F8CAFFC2C8525753
E005573FF/$FILE/WashingtonGroup.pdf (reporting that the number of cases filed increased
from 2.5 million per year to 4.1 million per year over that period).
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52

states have faced severe judicial-budget cuts. As the amount of work
has risen, courts are struggling to keep up. Most states cannot clear
53
matters as fast as they receive them, meaning that the nation’s courts
54
are accruing a growing backlog of open cases.
Staffing reductions and increased demand have led to significant
delays in court proceedings. With fewer trial hours and less staff,
cases of all kinds face long waits to come before a judge. But because
constitutional protections for defendants force states to prioritize
55
criminal trials, the long delays caused by reduced funds primarily
affect civil cases. California’s experience illustrates the impact. In San
Francisco County, cuts led the presiding judge to estimate that a
newly filed lawsuit will take five years to go to trial, and an
56
uncontested divorce will take at least a year. In San Diego County, a
child custody evaluation takes up to sixteen weeks, up from about
57
four. Even contesting a traffic citation, a relatively routine
58
procedure, may take nine months. The presiding judge of Los
Angeles County Superior Court commented that the lack of staff in
California courts will “[leave] litigants with no expectation of relief or
59
resolution of their cases for extended periods of time.” California is
by no means alone in reducing access to civil proceedings. New
60
Hampshire postponed jury trials for eighteen to twenty-four months.
61
One judicial circuit in Georgia simply suspended every civil trial.
52. See id. at 4–5 (documenting budget cuts in Florida); WASH. ECON. GRP., supra note 49,
at 3 (documenting budget cuts in Georgia); Glaberson, supra note 36 (documenting budget cuts
in New York).
53. See LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 29 (“Of the 28 unified and general
jurisdiction courts . . . only 7 have achieved [case clearance rates] at or above 100 percent.”).
54. In October 2008, Florida alone had a backlog of 338,000 civil cases. WASH. ECON.
GRP., supra note 51, at 1.
55. See, e.g., Hunstein, supra note 31, at 5 (“Due to the speedy trial requirement in criminal
cases, some judges have been forced to put civil cases on hold.”). Even with the constitutional
protections of a speedy trial, criminal proceedings face long delays. Fulton County, Georgia,
which contains most of Atlanta, had 183 murder cases waiting to be tried in early 2010, half of
which were more than a year old. Id. After a reduction in weekend court hours, New York City
faces the prospect of releasing people who are charged with crimes because the system cannot
provide an arraignment hearing within twenty-four hours of arrest. Glaberson, supra note 36.
56. The Judicial System: The Feeblest Branch, supra note 50, at 31.
57. Dolan & Kim, supra note 44.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. As States Cut Court Budgets, Who Pays the Price? (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 4, 2011),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=141043681.
61. Bill Rankin, Budget Cuts Take Toll on Georgia Courts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 10,
2011, at B2.
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The state-court funding crisis is beginning to have deep impacts
on the nation. Some of the effects are economic. For example, studies
suggest that court delays could cost Florida’s economy $17.4 billion
62
63
annually and eliminate up to 7000 high-wage jobs in Georgia. The
more troubling effect of the funding crisis is the reduced access to
justice and dispute resolution. Courts provide what the legislature and
the executive cannot: protection from the political process. Courts
64
protect rights that popular government may ignore. Commenting on
the structure of the U.S. Constitution, Alexander Hamilton noted the
tendency of the political branches to make rash decisions that bring
65
“serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.”
According to Hamilton, courts are “requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
66
humors.” Thus, the barriers placed on court access by budget cuts
are not simple inconveniences; they are threats to the liberty of
American citizens. If the judiciary loses its ability to effectively
defend rights, it cannot serve the protective function that the
founders intended. Foreseeing the ease with which the other branches
could undermine the judiciary, Hamilton warned that “all possible
67
care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.”
As Hamilton recognized, the American system of government
depends on a judiciary strong enough to check the excesses of the
other branches. Because state courts handle most litigation in the
United States, the nation cannot respect this separation-of-powers
principle without maintaining effective and independent state courts.
Thus, the funding crisis described within this Part demands an
62. WASH. ECON. GRP., supra note 51, at 16.
63. WASH. ECON. GRP., supra note 49, at 1.
64. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter within
the limits assigned to their authority.”).
65. Id. at 469.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 465–66. The discussion of the federal judiciary in Federalist No. 78 does not
necessarily oblige states to create a similarly independent judiciary. At the time of the adoption
of the U.S. Constitution, most state constitutions reflected the view that the legislature, as the
representative of the people, should dominate the other branches of government. G. Alan Tarr,
Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329,
334 (2003). Throughout the nineteenth century, however, states found themselves suffering from
legislative excess. Id. As of 1998, forty state constitutions explicitly stated a separation-ofpowers requirement, an expression of judicial independence not found in the U.S. Constitution.
Id. at 337.
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immediate and effective solution. As the remainder of this Note
argues, the doctrine of inherent power provides a viable legal avenue
for combatting the problem.
II. THE HISTORY AND COMPLICATIONS OF INHERENT JUDICIAL
POWER
Before proposing a new standard, this Note provides some
background on the doctrine of inherent power. Inherent power began
as a means of internal judicial housekeeping and grew into a method
to secure discrete resources from local governments. In addition, a
small number of courts have attempted to use the doctrine to make a
wholesale challenge to the sufficiency of a state judicial budget. This
latter broad use of inherent power exposed the problematic potential
of employing inherent power in a state-level budget dispute—at least
as the doctrine is currently formulated. Inherent power could too
easily serve as a tool for the judiciary to usurp the legislative authority
to appropriate state funds. Courts that assume legislative power
threaten their own legitimacy by taking part of the budgeting process
beyond public debate.
A. Brief History of Inherent Judicial Power
The first uses of inherent power had nothing to do with money.
Early state constitutions, though establishing the judiciary as a third
branch of government, did not fully define the scope of the courts’
68
power. In order to protect their ability to resolve disputes from the
influence of the political branches, courts developed mechanisms to
69
enforce judgments. These included the power to issue process, to
control records of the court, to punish contempt, to ensure court
70
decorum, to regulate the bar, and to control seized property. These
powers are “inherent” because they derive not from express
authority, but from the need for courts to maintain their integrity as
71
adjudicators of disputes. Inherent power can be understood as an

68. Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers
Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1000–01 (2004).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1001–02 & nn.69–75 (providing case law citations for the listed examples).
71. G. Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse,
and Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12, 14 (2004); see also Wayman v. Southard, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1825) (“Every Court has, like every other public political body, the
power necessary and proper to provide for the orderly conduct of its business.”).
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“implicit necessary and proper clause,” which extends courts’
legitimate scope beyond what is specifically enumerated in
72
constitutions and statutes.
From these efforts to regulate internal housekeeping, courts’ use
of inherent power developed during the twentieth century into a
doctrine robust enough to demand additional funds from the other
branches of government. These demands, however, were typically
modest and for specific expenditures that a court deemed necessary
73
to conduct business.
Some examples will illustrate. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer
74
of Worcester, required a county treasurer to release $86 for a tape
recorder and tapes, which a county court bought to record court
75
proceedings when a stenographer was not available. In Grimsley v.
76
Twiggs County the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a superior
court judge could compel its county commissioners to pay for extra
77
clerical help. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in In re Alamance
78
County Court Facilities, even required a county to provide a new
courthouse facility because the existing one was deemed “grossly
inadequate, being in the large either obsolete, poorly designed, or
79
nonexistent.” A common thread among these cases, and others like

72. Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. See id. (listing specific expenditures, including “temporary facilities for holding
court . . . [,] the operation of a courthouse elevator, chairs and carpeting for a courtroom, and
courthouse air conditioning”).
74. O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1972).
75. Id. at 610–11.
76. Grimsley v. Twiggs Cnty., 292 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. 1982).
77. Id. at 678.
78. In re Alamance Cnty. Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125 (N.C. 1991).
79. Id. at 127 (quoting the trial court’s order) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly,
the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld an inherent-power order requiring a county to fix a
longstanding noise problem in which trucks passing an adjacent highway drowned out
courtroom testimony. Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 795–96, 798 (Miss. 1988).
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80

them, was a dispute between a city or county court and the local
81
government body that funded it.
Nonetheless, state supreme courts have used these local disputes
to craft a theoretically powerful doctrine of inherent power. These
decisions extrapolate the power to compel funds from the basic
structure of American constitutional government, namely the
doctrine of separation of powers. O’Coin’s provides an example of
such reasoning. In demanding payment for a tape recorder, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held “that a judge may bind
a county contractually for expenses reasonably necessary for the
82
operation of his court.” The court grounded its explanation in the
state constitution: “Under our Constitution, the courts of the
Commonwealth constitute a separate and independent department of
government entrusted with the exclusive power of interpreting the
83
laws.” Judicial independence, as a part of the tripartite system,
84
protects “every natural right of free men.” Judges cannot maintain
their independence, however, if the system denies them the
“authority to determine the basic needs of their courts as to
85
equipment, facilities and supporting personnel.” That authority is
essential “if the courts are to provide justice, and the people are to be
86
secure in their rights.” The unwillingness of Worcester County to
buy a tape recorder was, thus, an affront to judicial independence and

80. See, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 738, 742 (Colo. 1963) (allowing a state district court
to set the salaries of its staff against the objection of the county commission unless the
compensation decisions were “wholly unreasonable, capricious and arbitrary”); Noble Cnty.
Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 125 N.E.2d 709, 717 (Ind. 1955) (upholding a county court’s power
to hire and fix the salary of an employee, “[u]nless [it] has abused its discretion”); Vondy v.
Comm’rs Court, 620 S.W.2d 104, 108 (Tex. 1981) (ordering a county to set a “reasonable salary”
for a constable); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Cnty. Court, 105 N.W.2d 876, 885 (Wis. 1960) (finding
that a county court “had the jurisdiction to institute on its own motion the proceedings to
determine the question of the necessity for air conditioning,” valued at $250).
81. Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 15.
82. O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608, 611 (Mass. 1972) (footnote
omitted).
83. Id. Other courts have further grounded their separation-of-powers argument in the
structure of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652, 660 (Ill.
2004) (“Like the federal government on which it is modeled, the government of the State of
Illinois is divided into three equal branches . . . . This provision embodies the doctrine of
separation of powers which has been a hallmark of American government . . . .”).
84. O’Coin’s, 287 N.E.2d at 611.
85. Id. at 612.
86. Id.
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a violation of the constitutional structure of government. O’Coin’s
noted that its separation-of-powers reasoning is “recognized not only
88
in Massachusetts but throughout the nation.”
Even though state supreme courts often cast the unwillingness of
a local government to pay for a court expense as an insidious affront
89
to judicial independence, courts have recognized that using inherent
power comes with potential dangers—even in local disputes of
relatively low magnitude. Courts are aware that the act of compelling
funds is itself arguably a violation of the separation-of-powers
doctrine; that is, a judicial tribunal is interfering with a legislative
90
body’s authority to appropriate tax revenue. Responding to this
concern, courts frequently insist that they are invoking inherent
91
power with reluctance. Accordingly, the inherent-power doctrine
has evolved to include a number of restraints on the power’s use.
First, courts have limited the circumstances under which a court may
92
compel funds. Most states demand that judges attempt and fail to
procure funding through the normal channels before invoking
93
inherent power. Some require that a judge seeking to compel funds
receive prior approval from a court administrator or the state
94
supreme court. Second, courts have established standards for
95
evaluating inherent-power requests. The majority of states demand
that compelled “expenditures are ‘reasonably necessary’ for the

87. See id. at 616 (“It is clear to us, however, that a county treasurer has no discretion in the
payment of legally incurred obligations.”).
88. Id. at 612.
89. See Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 14 (“Such disputes have prompted state
supreme courts to issue particularly high-flown paeans to judicial independence.”).
90. See, e.g., In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 169 (Wash. 1976) (“[E]ven in
enforcing the separation of powers, courts must intervene in the operation of other branches.”).
For an extended discussion of this concern, see infra Part II.B.
91. See, e.g., Grimsley v. Twiggs Cnty., 292 S.E.2d 675, 677 (Ga. 1982) (“The inherent
power of the court must be carefully preserved, but also cautiously used.”).
92. See Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power, 14 PACE L.
REV. 111, 118 (1994) (“[T]he courts placed a series of self-imposed limitations on the exercise of
inherent powers.”); see also Jackson, supra note 17, at 227 (“Reviewing courts have imposed or
identified several restraints on the inherent powers of courts. Included among these restraints
are procedural protections for funding authorities who challenge judicial authority . . . .”).
93. Jackson, supra note 17, at 227–28; see also, e.g., State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 137 P.
392, 395 (Mont. 1913) (“[W]hen . . . the established methods cannot or do not instantly meet,
then and not until then does occasion arise for the exercise of the inherent power.”).
94. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 118; see also, e.g., MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:05(1)
(requiring written approval by an appropriate judicial officer).
95. Jackson, supra note 17, at 233.
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effective (and perhaps efficient) administration of justice.” Others
97
98
have erected higher bars to inherent power: “clear necessity,” a
“compelling need essential to the orderly administration of the
99
100
court,” and “absolute necessity.”
Once courts established the theoretical foundation for using
inherent power to order relatively minor funding from local
101
governments, using the doctrine more broadly proved irresistible.
Two events symbolized the transformation of inherent power into a
doctrine powerful enough to impact statewide budgets. First, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v.
102
Tate used the doctrine to contest the general sufficiency of a court103
system budget. Second, Sol Wachtler, chief judge of the New York
Court of Appeals, made an unsuccessful attempt to force the state’s
governor and legislature to increase spending on New York’s judicial
104
branch.
Carroll involved a dispute over the budget for the Philadelphia
105
Court of Common Pleas. In December 1969, the local court
submitted a budget request to the city, which rejected the request and
106
reduced the court’s appropriations. When the city council refused to
107
modify its decision, the judges of the court sued the city. The

96. Id.
97. A few state supreme courts, however, have set the bar lower than reasonable necessity,
permitting a court to act on its own initiative to spend funds. See, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d
738, 742 (Colo. 1963) (allowing a court to set a salary schedule subject to reversal only when the
County Board could establish that the schedule was “wholly unreasonable, capricious and
arbitrary”).
98. Rose v. Palm Beach Cnty., 361 So. 2d 135, 138 (Fla. 1978).
99. Grimsley v. Twiggs Cnty., 292 S.E.2d 675, 677 (Ga. 1982).
100. Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 798 (Miss. 1988).
101. Though merely compelling $86 from a county treasurer to purchase a tape recorder,
O’Coin’s predicted broader use of inherent power, noting that “[n]othing stated herein should
be taken to mean that the Commonwealth may not be bound in the same manner [as a county].”
O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608, 611 n.2 (Mass. 1972).
102. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971).
103. See id. at 194–95 (recounting the petitioning court’s request for a budget increase).
Though it represents an expansion of inherent power beyond the scope articulated in the cases
discussed previously, Carroll actually predates many of them.
104. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 122 (“Prior to Wachtler v. Cuomo, there were no
significant inherent power conflicts between coequal state branches of government.”).
105. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 194–95. The Court of Common Pleas is the trial-level county court
for both civil and criminal cases. Common Pleas Court, UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYS. OF PA.,
http://www.pacourts.us/courts/courts-of-common-pleas (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
106. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 194–95.
107. Id. at 195.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a resulting order demanding an
108
additional $2,458,000 for the budget of the Court of Common Pleas.
Though recognizing that governing requires the “harmonious
109
the
cooperation between the three independent Branches,”
supreme court announced that when this cooperation breaks down, a
court can compel “reasonable and necessary [additional funds] to
110
carry out its mandated responsibilities.”
The supreme court
explicitly rejected the contention that the city’s failing finances should
be factored into the reasonability of the local court budget, declaring
that “the deplorable financial conditions in Philadelphia must yield to
the Constitutional mandate that the Judiciary shall be free and
independent and able to provide an efficient and effective system of
111
Justice.”
The aggrieved court in Carroll presented a fundamentally
112
different request than courts in other inherent-power cases. Those
cases identified a particular resource that the court deemed
113
indispensable to court business. By contrast, the Court of Common
Pleas in Carroll determined that the city council’s appropriation of
114
inadequate funds itself was sufficient to trigger inherent power. The
115
only thing the court asked for was more money. Thus, the decision
in Carroll represented a potential direct threat to legislative
appropriation power. As some observers noted, the case prescribed a
method by which courts could use inherent power to circumvent their
116
funding authority’s budget process.
At the time of Carroll and in the years following, state courts
underwent dramatic shifts in funding and organization, shifts that
held great import for the use of inherent power. Until the 1940s state
trial courts operated independently of each other and were primarily

108. Id. at 199–200. A state appellate judge, whom the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
specifically designated to hear the case, issued this order against the city. Id. at 195.
109. Id. at 197.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 199.
112. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 116 (“[Carroll] marked an expansion of the inherent
powers doctrine into broader fiscal matters than in previous cases.”).
113. See supra notes 73–80.
114. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 194.
115. Id. at 195.
116. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 117 & n.35 (citing commentators who made such an
observation about Carroll).
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117

funded by local governments. The state legislature held little
118
influence over either lower courts’ budgets or their administration.
The second half of the twentieth century saw a move toward unified
119
judicial systems. The particular ways that states unified their
120
systems varied, but some trends emerged. First, unified systems
tend to have a powerful state supreme court, which is given
“significant rulemaking and superintending authority over the judicial
121
branch.” Second, unified judicial systems often operate under a
122
single budget approved by the legislature. The move to unitary
systems made local inherent-power disputes less common, as courts
now appealed to the state supreme court for funding rather than, for
123
example, to a county commission. At the same time, unifying
judicial systems pushed conflicts over sufficient judicial budgets from
the local level to the state level, increasing the potential for an
inherent-power showdown between a state supreme court and a state
124
legislature.
Such a showdown occurred in New York in 1991. By then the
state’s courts were operating under a unified system with a single
125
budget. The chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Sol
Wachtler, submitted a budget to Governor Mario Cuomo requesting
126
an 8 percent increase in judicial spending over the previous year.
Cuomo, in the “largest package of spending cuts in New York State’s
history,” responded by recommending that the legislature, instead,
127
reduce the judicial budget by 2.8 percent. Wachtler did not react

117. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1013 (“A state supreme court [was] generally the only
court funded entirely from the state treasury . . . .”).
118. See id. at 1016 (“[S]tate legislatures paid little attention to the administrative structure
of the courts or the associated costs of running them because very few courts were funded
directly from the state treasury.”).
119. See Henry O. Lawson, State Court System Unification, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 278
(1982) (reporting that by 1979, twenty-two states had moved to centralized court funding and
several others were considering doing so).
120. For a discussion of the complexities of court unification, see generally Victor E. Flango
& David B. Rottman, Research Note, Measuring Trial Court Consolidation, 16 JUST. SYS. J., no.
1, 1992, at 65; Lawson, supra note 119.
121. Buenger, supra note 68, at 1015 n.114.
122. Id. at 1017.
123. Glaser, supra note 92, at 121.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 121 n.50.
126. Id. at 124.
127. Sam Howe Verhovek, Cuomo Proposing Steep Budget Cuts and Tax Increases, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1991, at A1.
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well. In a public speech, he noted that other states had used inherent
power to increase judicial budgets and added, “As far as I’m
128
concerned, that’s an unconstitutional budget.” In September 1991,
Chief Judge Wachtler filed a lawsuit against Cuomo, claiming that the
governor, in coordination with the legislature, had not allocated
129
adequate funds to the state judiciary. In addition, to demonstrate
the financial condition of the courts, Wachtler fired five-hundred
130
court workers. He also stepped boldly into a feud with Cuomo. The
131
two jabbed at each other in the papers, and eventually Cuomo filed
132
a countersuit to remove the dispute to federal court.
The conflict ended when Chief Judge Wachtler and Governor
133
Cuomo settled the lawsuit days before the start of merit arguments.
The chief judge did not receive any of the additional court funding he
declared constitutionally necessary; the governor merely pledged not
134
to reduce the judicial budget below 1991 levels. The feud did
manage, however, to demonstrate the potential messiness of a statelevel battle over the constitutionality of court funding. Both Chief
Judge Wachtler and Governor Cuomo received scorn for their
135
behavior during the dispute. In addition, Chief Judge Wachtler may
have failed to convince the public of the merits of his inherent-power
128. Elizabeth Kolbert, Wachtler Says Cuomo Cut Judiciary Funds Unconstitutionally, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at B5. The budget procedure in New York requires the governor to pass
on the judiciary’s budget request to the legislature “without revision but with such
recommendations as the governor may deem proper.” N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Cuomo did so,
but in a separate “financial plan,” proposed a budget for the judicial system that was 10 percent
lower than the judiciary’s request. Kolbert, supra. Wachtler argued that this maneuver was
unconstitutional. Id. Notwithstanding this technical quarrel, the chief judge’s fundamental
complaint was about the inadequacy of the judicial budget. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 127
(“[T]he Chief Judge . . . suggest[ed] that the ‘enormity’ of the cuts would justify legal action.”
(quoting Gary Spencer, Legislature Appropriates $899 Million for Judiciary, N.Y. L.J., June 4,
1991, at 1)).
129. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 128 (describing the case).
130. Id. at 128.
131. See id. at 128–34 (recounting the public-relations battle between the two men).
132. Id. at 130. After initially filing his notice of removal in the Eastern District of New
York, Governor Cuomo refiled his case in the Northern District of New York upon that court’s
issuing “an order directing the parties to respond to its sua sponte consideration of jurisdiction.”
Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 91-CV-1235, 1991 WL 249892, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1991).
133. Id. at 135.
134. Gary Spencer, Wachtler, Cuomo Settle Funding Suit, 207 N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17, 1992, at 1.
135. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Cuomo Challenges His Chief Judge’s Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1991, at B1 (“Is it not time now . . . to withdraw from what will become a public spectacle with
no benefit to the people whom both the talented Governor and the learned Chief Judge so
desperately want to serve?” (quoting Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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claim. An editorial in the New York Times commented that the chief
judge had “escalate[d] an unseemly feud into a constitutional crisis”
136
and declared the legal issues in the case “beside the point.”
B. Inherent Judicial Power’s Two Big Problems
In the Wachtler/Cuomo dispute, the doctrine of inherent power
proved a failure. One side made a political decision about the size of
the judiciary budget. The other side made a legal judgment that the
same budget was too meager. Both the governor and the court of
appeals are the pinnacles of coequal branches of state government, so
they found themselves at a constitutional stalemate. Neither legal
precedent nor political tradition provided a resolution to their
dilemma. The New York confrontation was not inherent power’s first
big defeat, however. Despite a victory in Carroll—the case that
defined the now-dominant reasonable necessity standard—the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas never actually received any of
137
the additional funding ordered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Why has inherent judicial power proved unimpressive in statelevel disputes? Few would dispute that judiciaries, like other branches
of government, have some level of authority to effectuate their
138
constitutionally required functions. Yet in its most pressing hour—a
budget dispute between two branches of state government—inherent
power has fallen short of its promise. Rather than harness the sacred
tenant of judicial independence to combat the folly of shortsighted
legislatures, inherent power has exposed itself as no more than mere
words.

136. Editorial, Wachtler v. Cuomo = Two Losers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at A28. The
chief judge held press conferences and released public statements to draw attention to his
protest against the governor. Glaser, supra note 92, at 128–29; Verhovek, supra note 127. The
failure of his inherent-power requests thus suggests that he was unable to sway public opinion in
his direction.
137. In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 174 n.6 (Wash. 1976) (“[T]he Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas has never received any of the $1,365,555 awarded by the court in
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate . . . .”). In addition, the Juvenile Director court noted that
the county involved in Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Wayne County, 190 N.W.2d 228
(Mich. 1971), had ignored the Michigan Supreme Court’s determination that circuit courts had
the inherent power to require the county to compensate circuit court employees, Juvenile Dir.,
552 P.2d at 174 n.6.
138. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 17, at 223 (“An overly expansive reading of constitutional
texts is not required to suggest that the three branches of state government, in furtherance of
their constitutionally mandated responsibilities, must have authority to . . . [do acts] beyond
those explicitly stated in the constitutional texts.”).
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In the decade after the Wachtler/Cuomo incident, commentators
139
pondered inherent power’s insufficiencies. They found two major
140
problems with the doctrine. One, by compelling funds, a supreme
court threatens to usurp the appropriation power properly placed in
the state legislature. Two, using a judicial order to requisition funds
takes a portion of the state budget out of the political process.
Circumventing the public will and the give-and-take of the state
budget procedure threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the
courts. Both of these problems result from the lack of judicial
discipline provided by the dominant inherent-power standard,
reasonable necessity.
1. Inherent Power Encroaches on Legislative Appropriation
Authority. State supreme courts have argued that by failing to
provide adequate appropriations to the judicial branch, legislatures
141
have overstepped their constitutional bounds. Yet a court order
demanding additional funding from a legislature also smacks of
constitutional wayfaring. In the context of a state-level budget
dispute, inherent power contains the potential to usurp the
142
legislature’s power to spend state revenues as it finds appropriate. If
uncabined, inherent power becomes, in effect, a secondary
appropriations process. In its most abusive form, the doctrine
provides a judicial veto over a portion of state budget. As Professor
139. Although this Note focuses on commentaries produced after the Wachtler/Cuomo
dispute and the rise of the unified judicial branch, it is worth noting that earlier writers
recognized the difficulties of using inherent power in a state-level dispute. Most notable is a
1972 article by Professor Geoffrey Hazard and two law-student colleagues in which the authors
wrote:
A judicial requisition of funds . . . is in essence a judicial arrogation of discretion
conferred, for better or worse, on the popularly-elected branches of government.
Indeed, the virtue of [inherent power]—that it takes the problem of maintaining an
adequate court system out of the realm of public debate and political commitment—
may also be viewed as an essential vice. No important function of government can be
maintained over the long run without public debate . . . .
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Martin B. McNamara & Irwin F. Sentilles, III, Court Finance and
Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286, 1289–90 (1972) (footnote omitted).
140. At least one state supreme court has recognized these two problems as well. See
Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d at 169 (“[E]ven in enforcing the separation of powers, courts must
intervene in the operation of other branches.”); id. at 173 (“By in effect initiating and trying its
own lawsuits, the judiciary’s image of impartiality and the concomitant willingness of the public
to accept its decisions as those of a fair and disinterested tribunal may be severely damaged.”).
141. See, e.g., Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 269 (Fla. 1991) (“[A]ny
substantial reductions of the judicial budget can raise constitutional concerns of the highest
order.”).
142. Glaser, supra note 92, at 137.

YATES IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INHERENT JUDICIAL POWER

3/17/2013 7:37 PM

1483

Jeffrey Jackson notes, courts are particularly inept at evaluating the
143
appropriateness of appropriations. Inherent-power decisions often
fail to consider the financial condition of the funding bodies from
144
which they compel funds. Even when a court tries to do so,
145
however, it may find itself “incapable of the task.” The judicial
process does not seek the same ends as the political process. Courts
articulate rules and limits, whereas legislative bodies balance and
compromise. Defining a constitutionally demanded level of
reasonably necessary funding is “antithetical to a political process in
146
which priorities are negotiated rather than divined.”
By contrast, Howard Glaser describes inherent power as a
species of checks and balances which is properly employed to
preserve the independence of one branch of government from
147
invasion by another. Inherent power can only be a defensive
weapon. When the judiciary’s use of inherent power “diminishes the
rights and powers of a coordinate and equal branch,” the power
“ceases to act as a check on the other branches and begins to
148
encroach on their dominion.” Decreasing the power of another
branch is a line of demarcation over which inherent power cannot
rightly cross, argues Glaser. When a state supreme court demands
that the state fund the judiciary in excess of what the legislature has
deemed adequate, the court has stolen the appropriation power of the
149
legislature, “upsetting the fundamental alignment of the branches.”
For this reason, Glaser deems the use of inherent power in a state150
level budget dispute to be “untenable.”
2. Inherent Power Diminishes the Legitimacy of the Judiciary.
Broad uses of inherent power may also imperil the judiciary’s public
legitimacy. When a court demands additional funding from a
legislature, it becomes an explicitly political actor. Budgeting state
143. Jackson, supra note 17, at 243.
144. Id. at 242.
145. Id. at 243.
146. Id.
147. Glaser, supra note 92, at 136–37. Howard Glaser was a Special Assistant to Governor
Mario Cuomo during his administration. Id. at 111. He joined Governor Andrew Cuomo’s
administration as an aide to the governor and New York’s Director of State Operations. Danny
Hakim, Cuomo Fires Emergency Office Chief for Misusing Workers in Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2012, at A15.
148. Glaser, supra note 92, at 137.
149. Id. at 138.
150. Id. at 113.
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revenues is subject to popular pressure. By contrast, judicial
151
decisionmaking is, at least in theory, insulated from politics. But
when a court wades into a debate about state funding priorities,
whatever supposedly disinterested decision it renders becomes a
152
political issue. In addition, courts diminish their legitimacy by
153
removing a portion of the state budget from public debate. The
budget process gives the public, through its representatives, a voice in
154
the distribution of public resources. Courts do not express the will
of the people, at least in the direct manner that legislatures do. Thus,
a court’s use of inherent power may frustrate public input into state
155
spending, and the people may trust the courts less as a result.
3. The Cause of the Deficiencies: the Reasonable-Necessity
Standard. The two major problems created by the use of inherent
power in a state-level budget dispute are, in large part, a result of the
shortcomings of the reasonable-necessity standard. The standard does
not provide a meaningful distinction between a court’s protection of
the constitutional prerogatives of the judicial branch and a court’s
156
substitution of its spending priorities for those of the legislature.
This standard can easily serve as a mechanism for a court to put
constitutional imprimatur on a self-interested decision. Glaser uses
New York as an illustrative example of this problem. He notes that in
consolidated judicial systems with a central administration, state
supreme courts oversee the court budget and, in some cases, make
157
requests directly of the legislature. Thus, any level of funding that
151. See Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 108, 127 (1970) (“[The founding fathers] realized that individual liberty is
best protected by an independent judiciary composed of judges who are subject to the
Constitution alone.”).
152. As Professor Jackson notes, judicial independence, the supposed end of inherent
power, “entails a judiciary free from popular attitudes.” Jackson, supra note 17, at 243.
153. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1047 (“The judiciary must be cognizant of this
uncomfortable fact [that it is a secondary player in the budget process] lest it risk misreading the
public support so critical in legitimizing acts of government.”).
154. Michael Buenger calls this process a “constitutionally protected exercise in balancing
competing public demands.” Id. at 1045.
155. Inherent power may also damage courts’ future prospects for additional funding by
“reduc[ing] the likelihood of public debate on the issue of the adequacy of court funding.”
Jackson, supra note 17, at 248.
156. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 139–40 (“The reasonable and necessary standard is thus
no help as a device to screen out improper uses of inherent powers.”).
157. See id. at 121 (“[T]he introduction of lump-sum budget gave judges and court
administrators greater flexibility . . . .”); id. at 122 (describing the process by which the New
York chief judge makes a budget request of the governor).
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the supreme court finds necessary for the judicial system is, by
definition, reasonable; otherwise, the supreme court would not have
158
requested it. Glaser concludes that, rather than providing a limit, a
constitutional standard of reasonable necessity serves to make “every
budget request [by a court system] into one which would provide
159
grounds for an exercise of inherent power.”
The reasonable-necessity standard rests on the principle of
160
judicial independence. Yet the standard, as it has been applied,
reflects an inexact understanding of that concept. Courts demonstrate
independence in two ways. First, judges decide cases free from the
influence of the other branches of government, a quality one
161
commentator
has
labeled
“adjudicative
independence.”
Adjudicative independence is an accepted foundation of American
162
government. Uses of inherent power typical of earlier periods, such
as those that regulated courtroom decorum and enforced judgments,
fostered adjudicative independence to protect the right of judges to
effectuate impartial, binding decisions. Even after the
Wachtler/Cuomo dispute, inherent power in the service of
163
adjudicative independence has maintained broad scholarly support.
Post-Carroll, however, courts have used inherent power to
protect a broader kind of judicial independence—a “constitutional
164
independence” that protects the entire judiciary from the influence
of the political branches. As demonstrated by the cases discussed in
the previous Section, courts have proffered the principle of
constitutional independence to demand funds in support of smooth
judicial-branch operations—first on a courtroom-by-courtroom basis

158. Id. at 140.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
161. Buenger, supra note 68, at 1021.
162. Protecting the adjudicative independence of the judiciary is one of the purposes of the
Good Behavior Clause of the U.S. Constitution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 64, at 465.
163. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1021 (“At the most basic and traditional level, courts in
America possess adjudicative independence . . . .”); Glaser, supra note 92, at 150 (“[The
doctrine of inherent power] serves as a useful tool for local courts to protect themselves from
becoming overly subservient to local politicians.”); Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45
(“The inherent judicial power doctrine was developed to be a defensive weapon to protect
judges from subversion or obstruction by other officials.”).
164. Buenger, supra note 68, at 1024; cf. Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45
(describing adjudicative independence as the whole of “judicial independence” and labeling
constitutional independence “judicial effectiveness”).
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165

and then on behalf of entire judicial systems. Given the checks-andbalances system of American government, inherent power aimed at
166
constitutional independence appears “harder to justify.”
Legislatures have a powerful check against courts; they set judicialsystem budgets. Courts’ uses of inherent power to increase
constitutional independence—especially those that baldly demand
more money—have the potential to diminish the legislature’s
167
constitutional responsibility to guard the public purse.
The
reasonable-necessity standard does not provide a principled method
for cordoning uses of inherent power that diminish the power of the
168
legislature from those that threaten the state constitution. The
standard too easily permits judges to style their political
disagreements with the legislature as constitutional insufficiencies.
If the reasonable-necessity standard cannot adequately guide
courts in a state-level budget dispute, what remains of the doctrine of
inherent judicial power? Commentators have offered various
169
answers. At one extreme, Howard Glaser posits no scenario in
170
which inherent power functions appropriately at the state level.
Gregg Webb and Professor Keith Whittington are equally pessimistic
about the doctrine’s potential, allowing for its use only in the rare
situation in which judges can no longer adjudicate free from political
171
influence. Michael Buenger, former State Court Administrator for

165. See supra Part II.A.
166. See Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 (distinguishing attempts to influence
judicial decisions from mere competition for scarce resources).
167. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 138 (noting that such use of inherent power “would
redress the injury to the judiciary only by upsetting the fundamental alignment of the
branches”).
168. Id. at 140; see also Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 (describing the Kansas
chief justice’s plan to raise revenue independently of the legislature as “corrosive of the state’s
vital constitutional balance”).
169. In addition to the authors discussed in this Section, Professor Orlando E. Delogu
discusses the doctrine of comity as a means to resolve budget battles between state supreme
courts and legislatures. See generally Orlando E. Delogu, Funding the Judicial Department at a
Level the Supreme Judicial Court Deems “Essential to Its Existence and Functioning as a Court”
Is Required by Doctrines of Comity and Duties Imposed by Maine’s Constitution, 62 ME. L. REV.
453, 464–70 (2010).
170. See Glaser, supra note 92, at 150 (“[W]hen unitary financing and lump-sum budgeting
replace a fragmented process of line-item appropriations, the doctrine of inherent powers
outlives its usefulness.”).
171. See Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 (“The use of inherent judicial
powers . . . may be most justified in [situations in which legislatures attempt to influence judicial
decisions], which fortunately are rare. A less extreme, but more common, threat to judicial
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the Supreme Court of Missouri, would limit inherent power to cases
in which both the adjudicative and constitutional independence of the
172
courts are threatened. He seems more inclined than Webb and
Whittington to argue that such a case could arise in a fiscal and
173
political climate in which legislatures are eager to cut court funding.
Unfortunately, all of these responses to inherent power’s
limitations effectively remove the doctrine from the judiciary’s
quiver. The conditions under which a state supreme court can wield
inherent power acceptably, if they exist at all, would address only a
narrow subset of insufficient judicial budgets, ones that interfere with
judges’ ability to render an impartial judgment.
The inherent judicial power to compel funds should have greater
vitality. The doctrine is grounded in the separation of powers
174
expressed in the state and federal constitutions. The limitations of
inherent power, rather than demand that courts scrap the doctrine,
suggest that inherent power requires further refinement to be
relevant in a state-level dispute. The true difficulty of inherent-power
controversies lies in determining the line between a level of judicial
funding that violates constitutional demands and one that violates
only the preferences of the state supreme court. The reasonablenecessity standard proves little help in illuminating this distinction.
Courts will naturally conflate their own preferences with
constitutional reasonableness. Without a higher threshold than
reasonable necessity, inherent power drifts into the realm of judicial
legislation. But amending the inherent-power doctrine to minimize its
independence arises from the competition for limited resources. . . . In such situations, the use of
inherent judicial powers may be harder to justify.”).
172. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1048 (“At the state level, the use of inherent power to
compel funding would appear justified when a legislature’s exercise of its plenary authority over
the budget interferes with the courts’ ability to exercise their adjudicatory function and
undermines the judiciary’s constitutional status as an effective coequal institution of
government.”).
173. Compare Buenger, supra note 68, at 1048 (“The exercise of inherent power in the
context of defending the judiciary’s constitutional status promotes the principle of separation of
powers and makes clear that in the United States, the judiciary is an active participant in
governing the nation . . . .”), with Webb & Whittington, supra note 71, at 45 (“The rhetoric of
judicial independence accompanying earlier uses of inherent judicial power harkened back to a
pure theory of separation of powers, in which each branch was left free to exercise its own
functions without encroachment from the others, but the judicial dependence on the legislature
for its financing was a reflection of checks and balances that necessarily impinged on this
separation of powers.”).
174. Cases on inherent power from across the nation agree that the structure of American
tripartite government gives courts the power to compel funds. See Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d
890, 899 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam) (providing a partial list of such cases).
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harmful effects is possible. In the next Part, this Note will offer a
recipe for doing so.
III. A HIGHER STANDARD: ABSOLUTE NECESSITY TO PERFORM
THE DUTIES REQUIRED BY FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
This Part proposes a standard for using inherent power in statelevel budget disputes. The proposed standard is more stringent than
the reasonable-necessity standard articulated in most jurisdictions. By
adopting the new standard, state courts can reserve the use of
inherent power for critical situations, thus limiting the potential for
the doctrine to threaten judicial independence and the legislature’s
appropriation power.
Specifically, courts should adopt a standard of absolute necessity
to perform the duties required by federal and state constitutional
law—or constitutional absolute necessity, for short. At least one
commentator has expressed his preference for an absolute-necessity
175
standard, but he took his discussion no further. This Note will build
on that suggestion and argue that an absolute-necessity test,
combined with a requirement that courts identify a particular
constitutional violation resulting from insufficient funding, addresses
the problems of inherent power discussed in the last Part while
preserving the power as a viable option for courts that are in financial
peril. The proposed standard reserves inherent power for situations
that truly threaten a judicial system’s ability to function. By limiting
inherent power’s scope and grounding the doctrine in state
constitutions, courts can avoid diminishing the legislature’s
appropriation power and can preserve the judiciary’s public
176
legitimacy.
This Note moves past the reasonable-necessity standard adopted
by a majority of states, but it does not create its new, heightened
standard from nothing. The standard of constitutional absolute
necessity combines the concepts of two existing inherent-power cases,
175. Jackson, supra note 17, at 244. Professor Jackson suggests that an absolute-necessity
standard would be “more manageable” because “a court could order funding only when
necessary to preserve its existence.” Id.
176. Gregg Webb and Professor Keith Whittington offer a similar suggestion: “The
requirement of a finding that the states have actually violated constitutional provisions for
maintaining a functioning judicial system may also set a higher and more publicly sustainable
threshold for judicial action than does the reasonable necessity standard . . . .” Webb &
Whittington, supra note 71, at 45. But, like Professor Jackson, they say no more.
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Hosford and Wynn. These cases control in their respective states, but
their perspectives on inherent power have spread no further. Both of
these cases address the problem of judicial discretion by limiting the
scope of the inherent-power doctrine—Hosford by adopting
177
“absolute necessity”
and Wynn by requiring a constitutional
178
imperative. Though the guidelines of either case on their own are
insufficient to address the current shortcomings of inherent power,
mixing the principles of Hosford and Wynn provides a solid template
for a new approach.
A. The Foundations of the Standard: Hosford and Wynn
Hosford involved a county courthouse situated along the main
179
street of a Mississippi timber town. The courthouse contained
neither air conditioning nor fans, so its windows remained open
180
during court proceedings. The noise of passing trucks made witness
181
testimony inaudible. The presiding judge stopped Billy Hosford’s
trial twenty-five to thirty times in six or seven hours to allow traffic to
182
subside. Hosford asked for a mistrial because of the distracting
183
184
noise. The judge denied the motion, but during the hearing he
noted that he had repeatedly asked county officials to fix the noise
185
problem. He also discovered that one juror confessed to reading
witness’s lips and another admitted that he missed portions of trial
186
testimony. In open court, the judge implored the state supreme
court to decide whether he could invoke inherent power to remedy
187
the situation.
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the trial judge in fact
188
possessed the authority to invoke inherent power against his county.
But in doing so, the supreme court warned that the doctrine should
not circumvent the budget process: “Of course, courts very largely are

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 798 (Miss. 1988).
Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 900.
Hosford, 525 So. 2d. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 794, 796.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 794–95.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 798.
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supplicants of the Legislative branch. . . . And, it is not what judges
individually or collectively think they should receive which controls,
189
but what the Legislature in its wisdom decides.” The legislature’s
190
discretion, however, “does not cover quite all the spectrum.” When
“the Legislative branch fails in its constitutional mandate to furnish
the absolute essentials required for the operation of an independent
and effective court, then no court affected thereby should fail to
191
act.” Though holding that the county had fallen short of its
constitutional burden, the court reiterated its uneasiness with
inherent power, calling its use “tortuous, distasteful, but at times
192
absolutely necessary.” In particular, the court worried that using
inherent power threatened the public’s perception of the judiciary’s
impartiality. A court’s disinterest is “responsible for the respect and
193
confidence which people have in their judges.” Facing the prospect
of usurping legislative power and diminishing the public’s trust in the
judiciary is “a situation no judge would wish upon himself,” so he
194
must proceed “[c]autiously, yet firmly.”
Although Hosford expertly articulated the balance between
legislative appropriation and inherent judicial power, the Mississippi
Supreme Court addressed only a dispute between a local judge and a
county commission. The case does not provide a general articulation
of the conditions under which a state legislature “fails in its
195
constitutional mandate to furnish the absolute essentials.” For that,
this Note turns to Wynn, an Alabama case.
Wynn involved a general challenge to Alabama’s judicial
196
budget, so the case gave the court leeway to discuss the specifics of a
constitutional floor to statewide judicial funding. In Wynn a circuit
judge filed suit against Alabama’s governor, claiming that judicialbranch funding reductions, as part of statewide pro rata budget cuts
197
authorized by statute, were unconstitutional.
The Alabama
Supreme Court declared that the legislature, via statute, “cannot

189. Id. at 797.
190. Id. at 798.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890, 891–92 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam).
197. Id. The governor invoked ALA. CODE § 41-4-90, which permits across-the-board
funding cuts to all state agencies to avoid deficit spending.
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constitutionally . . . reduce appropriations to the Judicial Branch
below that level necessary for the Judicial Branch to perform the
198
duties required of it under Federal and State constitutional law.”
The Wynn court’s key innovation is the word “duties.” Unlike
other inherent-power articulations, the one given in Wynn begins its
inquiry in the provisions of the governing constitution, rather than in
concepts more prone to judicial malleability, such as “administration
199
200
of Justice” or “proper operation of the courts.” A court searching
for a failed duty may not base its decision to compel funds solely on
201
the abstract idea of constitutional independence. Concerns that
legislative appropriations may threaten the coequal status of the
judiciary cannot alone justify the use of inherent power against a
legislature by a state supreme court.
Requiring a litigating court to demonstrate an inability to
perform a constitutionally mandated duty, however, is an exercise of
another sort. The court must find a failure to perform a function that
neither the legislature nor the courts themselves can abrogate. In
other words, when the federal or state constitution imposes a
particular duty, the courts have no choice but to perform that duty,
and the legislature has no choice but to fund the courts sufficiently in
202
their performance of that duty. The frustrations and political
posturing of judges and courts become less important; instead, the
inherent-power challenge focuses on the mandated performance of
state government. Of course, even under a standard that looks for
unmet
constitutional
responsibilities,
courts
must
make

198. Id. at 895. In another articulation of this standard, the Wynn court wrote that the
legislature could not reduce judicial appropriations “below what is adequate and reasonable for
the judiciary to perform its constitutionally mandated duties.” Id. at 896. The “adequate and
reasonable” language is pulled directly from the Alabama Constitution, which requires that
“[a]dequate and reasonable appropriations shall be made by the legislature for the entire
unified judicial system.” ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 149, as amended by ALA. CONST. amend. 328.
Thus, Alabama, by constitutional provision, has established a lower constitutional barrier to the
use of inherent power than this Note proposes.
199. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971); see also
Alamance Cnty. Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125, 132 (N.C. 1991) (“[A] court may invoke its
inherent power to do what is reasonably necessary for ‘the orderly and efficient exercise of the
administration of justice.’” (quoting Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 694, 696 (N.C. 1987))).
200. O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608, 612 (Mass. 1972).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 164–168.
202. See Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 896 (“This principle, that constitutional directions, first from
the United States Constitution and then from the Constitution of Alabama, take precedence
over legislative proscriptions and affect how those proscriptions apply, is critical to the
constitutional application of § 41–4–90.”).
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uncomfortable evaluations of their own operational sufficiency and
203
potentially divisive interpretations of governing documents.
Constitutional absolute necessity does not leave courts above claims
of self-interest, as no inherent-power standard can. However, by
moving the focus of inquiry from judges to constitutions, the
proposed standard diminishes the possibility that a court will
substitute its preferences for constitutional requirements.
The greatest difficulty in adopting Wynn’s articulation of
inherent power is determining the scope of constitutionally mandated
duties. The Wynn court, though professing that its enumeration was
not exhaustive, offered an extensive discussion of what the federal
204
and Alabama constitutions require of the state judicial system.
Under the U.S. Constitution, courts must guarantee individual rights,
such as freedom from “unreasonable search and seizure” based on
“‘stale’ or untimely information, execution, or judicial review” and
due process for “obtaining and confronting witnesses, rights against
205
self-incrimination, and a speedy public trial before a jury.” As noted
in Part I, however, ensuring these federal criminal protections has
206
shifted the brunt of funding deficits to civil proceedings, about
207
Using the Alabama
which the U.S. Constitution says little.
Constitution, however, Wynn went further. Under that document,
residents have a “guaranteed right to a forum for the enforcement of
208
209
his or her contracts,” “a right to prosecute a civil cause,” and “a
210
right to a jury trial” in civil cases. Thus, appealing to its state
constitution, Wynn contemplated a court’s use of inherent power to

203. See id. at 900 (“This Court recognizes, however, that . . . as a part of government, the
Judiciary must cooperate in every way possible with the Legislature as it performs its difficult
task of allocating limited resources.”).
204. Id. at 897.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding
“no basis in the Constitution for a rigid right to resolution of all civil claims within . . . a time
frame”); see also David Hittner & Kathleen Weisz Osman, Federal Civil Trial Delays: A
Constitutional Dilemma?, 31. S. TEX. L. REV. 341, 354 (1990) (“The difficulty that a court will
face in determining at what point [civil] delays become unconstitutional . . . raises the concern
that a court will consider the question nonjusticiable.”).
208. Id. at 898 (citing ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22).
209. Id. (citing ALA. CONST. art. I, § 10).
210. Id. (citing ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11).
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guarantee the provision of the basic adjudicative services expected of
211
the judicial system.
In addition to the explicitly enumerated requirements of the
federal and Alabama Constitutions, Wynn reasoned that duties
212
imposed on the courts by statute qualify as constitutional mandates.
The court cited examples of resource-consuming obligations imposed
on the judicial branch by both Congress and the Alabama
213
Legislature. Though Wynn did not spend space justifying its
extension of required constitutional duties to include statutory
obligations, the court was right to approve such an extension. Just as
the legislature may use its appropriation power to craft the judicial
budget, so too may the legislature use its plenary legislative power to
214
demand particular behaviors of courts. Complying with directives of
Congress and the state legislature is thus an expression of adherence
215
to the constitutional structure of government.
Wynn added one further degree to the scope of required duties.
The decision argued that if the federal and Alabama constitutions
require the courts to perform certain functions, then those
constitutions by extension must require the “allocation of sufficient
resources for administration and complete delivery [of those
216
services].”
Specifically, this allocation includes the “costs of
administrative support” and overhead expenditures such as “utility
service, postage, publication expenses . . . [and] communications
217
services.” The addition of associated administrative costs to the

211. Wynn used the Alabama Constitution and supporting case law to elaborate the scope of
its constitutional mandate. Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 898. Wynn’s reasoning applies to other states,
though the resulting set of required duties will differ depending on the requirements of those
states’ constitutions.
212. Id. at 897–98 & n.4.
213. Federal law demands that state courts hold bond hearings within seventy-two hours for
suspects arrested with a warrant and requires state courts to meet other federal requirements to
maintain federal funding. Id. at 897 & n.4. State law requires courts, for example, to present
juvenile court records before the tenth day of the month, file divorce reports with the state
board of health within the first five days of the month, and transmit court records to appellate
courts within specified time limits. Id. at 897.
214. See Buenger, supra note 68, at 1007 n.92 (“[T]he structure of state and federal courts
remains a matter squarely within the purview of the legislature.”).
215. Upholding statutory mandates has become a point of increased concern. Even as they
have reduced judicial budgets, state legislatures have required courts to perform an evergrowing number of social-service functions. ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE
JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 2.
216. Wynn, 631 So. 2d at 897.
217. Id. at 896.
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definition of mandated constitutional duties serves to broaden the
effectiveness of Wynn’s inherent-power standard. Administrative
costs are the battleground of the state-court budget crisis: rather than
cease performance of a mandated judicial duty, judicial systems tend
218
to reduce overhead costs, generally by decreasing their workforces.
At some level, these overhead reductions make provision of a
constitutionally required service so cumbersome that its exercise is
meaningless.
An
inherent-power
standard
that
includes
administrative costs greatly increases the ability of the doctrine to
remedy a situation in which a court provides nominal, but inadequate,
mandated services.
B. Advantages of the Proposed Standard
The inherent-power standard this Note proposes—absolute
necessity to perform the duties required under federal and state
constitutional law—provides several advantages over the current
reasonable-necessity standard. The higher standard addresses the
interbranch balance and public-legitimacy issues precipitated by the
219
reasonable-necessity standard, but it leaves courts’ inherent power
robust enough to prove a useful tool in state-level budget disputes.
Importantly, constitutional absolute necessity addresses the
shortcomings of inherent power discussed in Part II.B—its potential
both to usurp the appropriation power of the legislature and to
diminish the legitimacy of the judiciary. The standard does so
primarily by reducing the potential pool of disputes for which
inherent power can provide a solution. Any supreme court that
compels funds from a legislature is subject to accusations of upsetting
interbranch balance for its own self-interest, no matter what standard
220
it employs. However, by refusing to consider inherent power an
appropriate response to funding disagreements that do not meet the
narrow criteria within the standard of constitutional absolute
necessity, courts may speak with authority and legitimacy to those
disagreements that do. First, by pointing to a constitutionally
mandated duty that the judicial system absolutely cannot perform

218. See ABA TASKFORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., supra note 8, at 2–3
(describing how decreased judicial budgets have demanded immediate workforce reductions).
219. See supra notes 156–168 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 798 (Miss. 1988) (articulating an “absolute
necessity” standard and warning that “the darkest cloud which can be cast upon a judge’s honor
is suspicion that he has a personal interest in a case”).
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without additional funding, a court’s use of inherent power will look
less like a circumvention of the legislature’s appropriation power and
more like a disinterested interpretation of the constitution. Second,
because the use of inherent power would require the protection of a
specific constitutional duty, the public is more likely to approve of its
use. The American public broadly accepts the idea that constitutions
221
form the foundation of our legal system. If a judicial system can
justifiably argue that a legislative budget prevents it from providing a
constitutionally required public service, the effort may very well win
the support of the people.
In addition, the proposed standard would limit the breadth of an
inherent-power remedy. One of the strongest critiques of Carroll, the
222
case that birthed the reasonable-necessity standard, was the extent
to which the court significantly restructured Philadelphia’s judicial
223
budget. Such heavy-handed remodeling of the city’s appropriations
appeared to observers as an end-run around a disappointing
224
budgeting outcome. Constitutional absolute necessity, by contrast,
requires courts to identify specific unmet duties. As a consequence, a
court adopting this standard may use its inherent power to remedy
only specific constitutional violations that justify the use of inherent
power. In other words, the court may ask the legislature only for
additional resources sufficient to successfully perform the duties it
deems unfulfilled—but no more. A supreme court’s interference with
a legislature’s appropriation will remain discrete and limited.
The standard of constitutional absolute necessity further
improves current doctrine by implicitly demanding that judiciaries

221. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1812 (2005) (“[I]t should suffice to say that the Constitution is the document and set of
amendments thereto that are broadly accepted as the written expression of the foundational
commitments of the United States as a political community . . . .”); Humphrey Taylor, What We
Love and Hate About America, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (June 8, 2010), http://www.
harrisinteractive.com/vault/HI-Harris-Poll-Love-Hate-About-America-2010-06-08.pdf
(reporting that 70 percent of 2503 Americans polled in May 2010 viewed the U.S. Constitution
favorably).
222. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971) (“[T]he burden
is on the Court to establish that the money it requests is reasonably necessary for ‘the efficient
administration of justice.’” (quoting Leahey v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa. 1949))).
223. See, e.g., Glaser, supra note 92, at 116 (“[Carroll] marked an expansion of the inherent
powers doctrine into broader fiscal matters than in previous cases. Substantial budget items for
an entire municipal court system were in dispute . . . .”).
224. See id. at 117 (“In the wake of [Carroll], commentators predicted (with varying degrees
of approval) that courts . . . had found a tool by which they could circumvent the budget
process.”).
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both prioritize constitutional responsibilities and use their resources
efficiently before compelling funds through inherent power. Under
the standard, a court hearing an inherent-power request in a statelevel budget dispute must decide when the meagerness of a general
judicial budget renders a court incapable of rendering a specific
constitutionally required duty. The inquiry requires finding some
causation between the two. In states with consolidated court funding,
the judiciary has the flexibility to allocate its resources among its
225
different components. Courts should not use inherent power, under
a rule of constitutional absolute necessity, to compel funding for
programs to which they refuse to direct their already allocated
money. Judicial systems must show that their total budget, utilized
efficiently, leaves some constitutionally mandated duties unfeasible.
This is a high bar, and an exact line between sufficient and insufficient
funding will always be murky and fact-specific. But as state-court
funding continues to decrease, and as judiciaries cut back more and
more services, drawing a connection between unmet constitutional
mandates and an insufficient general judicial budget may prove
226
easier.
C. Responding to Possible Concerns with Constitutional Absolute
Necessity
Even if the legal standard constraining inherent power is raised
from reasonable to absolute necessity, one might doubt the practical
effect of the heightened standard. An objector might ask two related
questions. First, does an absolute-necessity standard constrain judicial
discretion any more than a reasonable-necessity standard? Judges
who are willing to threaten the legitimacy of the courts to demand
more funding from the legislature may be equally willing to invoke
inherent power no matter the standard required. They are already
227
convinced of the dire condition of the courts. Second, does
requiring absolute necessity adequately distinguish scenarios that
permit the use of inherent power from those that do not? Absolute
necessity, like reasonable necessity, defies a clear definition. Judges,

225. Hazard et al., supra note 139, at 1293–94; see also ROBERT W. TOBIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, FUNDING THE STATE COURTS: ISSUES AND APPROACHES 60 tbl.4 (1996),
available at http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/financial/id/5 (describing the
features of different types of centralized control of judicial budgets).
226. For an application of the proposed standard to a factual situation, see infra Part III.D.
227. See supra Part I.
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who have a personal interest in the outcome of a court-funding
dispute, are in a poor position to provide the substance of the terms.
Both of these questions recall an objection shared by Howard
Glaser and Professor Jackson: that regardless of the legal definition
involved, courts may not determine the budget of the judiciary—a
228
political task outside the legitimate scope and competency of courts.
Increasing the standard from reasonable to absolute necessity may
raise the bar, but according to Glaser and Professor Jackson, the
heightened language cannot justify what is essentially a self-interested
and unprincipled distinction between necessary and unnecessary
funding. Moreover, what constitutes absolute necessity could vary
widely. For example, sitting supreme court judges may find two law
clerks and a robust judicial administration office absolutely necessary
229
to perform their constitutional duties. By contrast, a state legislator
steadfastly committed to lowering taxes may contend that the
judiciary can claim no absolute necessity for additional funding as
long as the courts are functioning at some minimal level, even “if it
230
means having trials outdoors under trees.”
Within some limits, these objections have merit. Absolute
necessity, like reasonable necessity, allows too wide a domain for the
subjectivity of judges. But this Note does not propose adoption of the
absolute-necessity standard in isolation. Courts must also find that,
without additional funds, the judicial system will fail to meet a
constitutionally mandated duty. A court invoking inherent power
under the constitutional absolute-necessity standard must point to a
potential judicial deficiency and ground that deficiency in either the
federal or state constitution. The proposed standard forces judges
through the process of comparing the conditions of their judicial
system with the particular requirements of their state constitution.
The standard demands an objective inquiry. Moreover, even if judges
issuing inherent-power orders under constitutional absolute necessity
might have reached the same result under the reasonable-necessity
standard, the new standard forces them to ground their decision in

228. See supra Part II.B.1.
229. Cf. Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Wayne Cnty., 190 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1971).
230. Bob Johnson, Alabama Chief Justice Race: Moore, Graddick Challenge Malone,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Mar. 11, 2012, at 5A. Roy Moore—who as of February 2013
serves as the chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court—was reported to have made this
comment about the potential for a minimally functioning judicial system during a campaign
event. Id. Although he is not a legislator, he made his comment while speaking to voters. This
comment represents a potential perspective on court funding, albeit an extreme one.
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constitutional law, not in their own judgment. By mixing an increased
threshold of need with a focused constitutional inquiry, the new
test—as a whole—limits judicial discretion.
Still, even if the new standard proposed in this Note usefully
narrows the field of factual situations sufficient to justify the use of
inherent power against a legislature, state supreme courts will
continue to face the possibility that legislatures will fail to comply
with their funding orders. A dispute between a supreme court and a
legislature is a fight between the highest body in two branches of state
government. There is no other authority to mediate between the two
231
parties. Though the supreme court has the authority to articulate
the scope and meaning of state law, it is powerless to enforce its
232
decision. Indeed, a legislature’s refusal to comply with an inherentpower order is not without precedent. In In re Salary of Juvenile
233
Director the Washington Supreme Court, though recognizing the
doctrine of inherent power, refused to invoke the power against one
234
of the state’s counties. The court remarked that “in circumstances
where courts have been unable to build a convincing case, compliance
235
with their financing orders has been problematic.” To support its
proposition, the court noted that the Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas never received any of the money ordered in Carroll and that a
Michigan county ignored its state’s supreme court’s demand for
236
additional funds to hire law clerks and a judicial assistant.
Undoubtedly, a state supreme court that invokes inherent power
runs the risk of screaming at an audience that refuses to listen. Our
diffuse, tripartite system of government ensures that no standard of
inherent judicial power can remove that possibility. And to be sure,
courts must take care to avoid an unheeded inherent-power order.

231. Cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (“[T]his Court has no power to
review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment . . . .”); Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1875) (“The State courts are the appropriate
tribunals, as this court has repeatedly held, for the decision of questions arising under their local
law, whether statutory or otherwise.”). Under the proposed standard, a state supreme court
could invoke inherent power to remedy a federal constitutional deficiency in the state judicial
system. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court might gain jurisdiction over an appeal.
232. See Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652, 660 (Ill. 2004) (“[The judicial branch] has
no treasury. It possesses no power to impose or collect taxes. It commands no militia.”).
233. In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1976).
234. Id. at 175.
235. Id. at 174.
236. Id. at 174 n.6 (discussing Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa.
1971); and Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Wayne Cnty., 190 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1971)).
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The judiciary depends on the strength of its words; an ignored court is
a weak court. Adopting the standard of constitutional absolute
necessity, however, lessens the chance that a legislature will turn a
deaf ear. The proposed standard reserves the use of inherent power
for absolutely necessary situations and demands that a court invoking
the power justify its decision by pointing to an unmet constitutional
duty. With these safeguards, an order from a state supreme court
should possess the legitimacy necessary to prod the legislature to
237
obey it.
D. Briefly Imagining the New Standard in Practice
The standard proposed in this Part will limit the permissible
scenarios under which state courts may invoke inherent power to
compel funds to maintain their constitutional independence. This
limitation serves to preserve the power’s legitimacy by rationing its
use. But will a rationed form of inherent power adequately meet the
challenges presented by the state-funding crisis? In other words, are
cutbacks in court funding actually preventing state courts from
performing any constitutionally required duties? If so, how might the
new inherent-power standard remedy such a problem?
Applying the standard of constitutional absolute necessity to the
state-court funding crisis described in Part I will help answer these
questions. In early 2011, the New York State Assembly passed a
238
budget that reduced funding for the judiciary by $170 million. The
New York State Bar conducted a study to determine the effects of the
239
budget cuts across the state. The study found a general reduction in
courthouse access, which resulted in delays and increased costs to
240
litigants. One court service, however, found itself particularly
devastated by the budget reductions: small-claims courts. In response
237. While Wynn was on appeal, the Alabama Legislature appropriated additional funds for
the judicial branch, making the governor’s lack of consideration of its financial condition moot.
Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890, 902 (Ala. 1993). If evidence existed to show that the lawsuit
influenced the legislature’s decision to increase judicial funding, Wynn would stand as a model
application of a court’s use of inherent power: a court declares funding insufficient, and in
response the legislature, rather than the court, remedies the problem.
238. Act of Mar. 25, 2011, ch. 52, 2011 N.Y. Laws 107; N.Y. STATE, ENACTED BUDGET:
FINANCIAL PLAN FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 9.
239. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE IMPACT OF
RECENT BUDGET CUTS IN NEW YORK STATE COURT FUNDING 7 (2012), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentID=62096.
240. Id. at 9.
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to the legislative cuts, the Eleventh Judicial District (Queens County)
241
eliminated three quarters of its nighttime small-claims operations.
As a result, litigants wishing to pursue their claims on the night-court
242
docket faced a six-month wait.
The standard this Note proposes—absolute necessity to perform
the duties required by federal and state constitutional law—would
allow a court to invoke inherent power to remedy this situation.
Under the New York Constitution, the legislature has the power to
“alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in
243
equity” of the judicial branch. The state assembly used this power
when it defined the purpose and scope of New York City’s small244
claims court as part of the New York City Civil Court Act.
According to that statute, the procedures of small-claims courts “shall
constitute a simple, informal and inexpensive procedure for the
245
prompt determination of [small] claims.” Constitutional absolute
necessity, as illuminated by Wynn, indicates that duties imposed on
246
court systems by legislation stand in as constitutional mandates. The
New York State Assembly created the small-claims court to provide a
simple and prompt method of dispute resolution. Waiting six months
for access to small-claims resolution is neither simple nor prompt.
Thus, at least in this particular domain, the New York courts are
unable to fulfill a constitutionally mandated duty.
This example brings up a broader observation about the
proposed standard. To justify a claim of inherent power under the
proposed standard, any additional funding must be absolutely
necessary. The operational condition of the New York judicial system
strongly indicates that the Eleventh Judicial District cannot allocate
any more resources to its small-claims courts. The system has already,
247
among other measures, closed courthouse doors early, reduced
248
249
experienced staff, limited library resources for pro se litigants,

241. Id. app. at K2.
242. Id. Pro se litigants are often unable to miss work to attend court in the daytime. Id. In
addition, the value of the disputes in small-claims courts will often make missing work
economically prohibitive.
243. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 30.
244. N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1802 (McKinney 1989).
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 212–215 and accompanying text.
247. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 239, at 13; see also id. app. at K1 (describing the
reduced hours in the Eleventh Judicial District).
248. Id. at 11.
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250

eliminated pro bono coordinators, and reduced the size of jury
251
pools to unsustainable levels. These measures make clear that the
New York judiciary can find little space to create greater savings or
efficiencies. To remedy its small-claims-court deficiency, therefore, it
must have more money.
Judiciaries have adapted to budget reductions primarily by
reducing the availability of court services, not by eliminating those
252
services altogether. In other words, state courts have worked
diligently to respond to legislative budget cuts in ways that do not
abrogate their constitutional duties. Constitutional absolute necessity,
therefore, will perform its remedial task at the margins. States
prioritize their court services. When the coffers are empty, judicial
systems eliminate or reduce services at the bottom of the priority list.
As judicial budgets continue to shrink, the cuts will, at some point,
imperil services seen as imperative. In New York, judicial-budget cuts
prevented access to small claims court. Inherent power should allow
the New York judiciary to demand more money to fix that problem.
As the funding crisis in New York festers and grows, the courts may
be forced to eliminate additional constitutionally mandated services.
When this happens, the standard of constitutional absolute necessity
will provide further legal remedies.
CONCLUSION
Judicial resources have withered during the last two decades.
Though courts make up only a small portion of most state budgets, in
tough financial times courts have lost significant percentages of their
funding. Legislatures often treat judicial systems as a politically
costless harvest of budget cuts. As their funding decreases, however,
courts struggle to provide the adjudicative services necessary for the
smooth functioning of the nation’s legal system and economy. Many
state judicial systems approach a point of fiscal crisis. Though not
political actors, courts should not fail to respond adequately to this
threat.

249. Id. at 14.
250. Id. at 15.
251. See id. at 16 (“[A]ttorneys’ challenges for cause are not receiving adequate
consideration due to concerns that there are not enough potential jurors to allow for
dismissals.”).
252. See supra notes 40–61 and accompanying text.
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Invoking inherent judicial power to compel funds against a
legislature can prove a viable tactic to combat inadequate judicial
funding. But an inherent-power dispute between a state legislature
and a state supreme court presents a quandary. What should happen
when the branch of state government authorized to levy taxes and
appropriate spending provides a coequal branch of government too
little money to operate? On the one hand, the legislature is the voice
of the people, and it has the right to allocate funding according to
political will. On the other hand, the state supreme court is the voice
of the state constitution, and even the legislature cannot stand above
the state’s governing document. Though there is no clear path out of
this dilemma, both branches involved in a funding dispute must
respect the integrity of the other. For this reason, courts need the
doctrine of inherent power. They must have a tool to voice their
conclusion that the legislature has violated the state constitution by
allocating too little money to the judiciary. But inherent power must
remain cabined. Judges may not apply the doctrine simply to disagree
with legislative budget choices.
As this Note has argued, adding further protections to the
currently articulated doctrine of inherent power strikes a balance
between these two concerns. Under a standard of absolute necessity
to perform the duties required by federal and state constitutional law,
courts may use inherent power in limited circumstances and with
particular restraints. Admittedly, the precise contours of the standard
remain undefined. Each state must employ the standard in its own
situation, given the particular mandates provided by its own
constitutional law. But by adopting the standard of constitutional
absolute necessity, a state judiciary may effectively challenge its
legislature while continuing to respect its rightful authority.

